The wrong answer to a tough question, part 3

Here are the first two of my "Top 5 Reasons" why former members of the Guatemalan army shouldn't be hired as a supplemental police force:

1. They don't have the right training.

Police training has an entirely different focus than military training. Imagine what would happen if, instead of upholding and enforcing the law, the police viewed law-breakers as "enemies" to be combated.

The Minister of Defense has stated, though, that these new special forces will receive an "intensive" course before they begin patrolling. According to an article in the Siglo XXI newspaper:

The group will be trained for 45 days, beginning March 1st. "Experts at the Police Academy will give them classes on human rights and police techniques" said a military spokesperson.

And no-one sees the irony in the fact that the Defense Ministry believes that all you need to impart full knowledge of human rights and police techniques is 45 days?!?! (One wonders if weekends are included.)

2. What about the "C" in PNC?

During the civil war, the National Police had conspired with the military to commit crimes against humanity such as kidnapping, torture, and murder. (Read "Guatemala's Secret Police Files")

As part of the Peace Accords signed in 1996 between the government and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), the National Police force was completely disbanded.

In its place, the peace accords called for the creation of the National Civilian Police (PNC) force which would be separated from the military and oriented towards public service and guaranteeing the rights and security of the population.

The Peace Accord entitled "Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society" called for the following reform to the Guatemalan Constitutional:

It shall be the only armed police force competent at the national level whose function is to protect and guarantee the exercise of the rights and freedoms of the individual; prevent, investigate and combat crime; and maintain public order and internal security. It shall be under the direction of the civil authorities and shall maintain absolute respect for human rights in carrying out its functions.

That Constitutional reform was never passed.

Still, in 1997 the Guatemalan Congress approved a law creating the National Civilian Police. Unfortunately, just a few years later, Human Rights Watch published a report describing the discouraging failures of the new PNC:

Police abuses continued to occur, made all the more serious by the lack of effective internal disciplinary mechanisms, and that virtually all PNC officers had been recycled from the unprofessional National Police, Treasury Police or the army.

Another important report to consider is Guatemala: Memory of Silence. This was the ground-breaking publication of the UN-sponsored Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), otherwise known as "Guatemala's Truth Commission".

The CEH was mandated by the Peace Accords to investigate human rights violations and violence connected with the armed confrontation and recommend measures to promote peace and national harmony.

They too warned against the continuing militarization of the country:

Considering the grave human rights violations committed by Army agents during the armed confrontation and the marked weakening of the social fabric as a direct consequence of the militarization, the CEH believes it vital to promote legislative measures which establish the fundamental bases for the correct relationship between the Army and civil society within a democratic system, and the necessary subordination of the Army to civilian rule.

These measures should include ... the apolitical role of the military and restricting its role to external defense.

The principal aim of the restructuring of the security forces ... is to convert the role of the police into one of genuine public service. This implies the exclusively civilian character of the police force...

On this basis and with a view to guaranteeing suitable future development of the duties of the police, the CEH particularly recommends:

73. That under the guidance of the Ministry of the Interior, the PNC begin a process of internal reflection in consultation with organizations from civil society, with the aim of producing and defining the doctrine of the civilian security forces, whose bases should be:

a) service to the community, without discrimination of any type and with respect for the multiethnic character of the Guatemalan nation;

b) development of the civilian nature of the police force and the demilitarization of its organization, hierarchy and disciplinary procedures ...

With amazing clarity (practically anticipating the defeat of the Constitutional reforms), the CEH made a concise recommendation:

78. That, in case the reforms proposed in the Peace Accords are unsuccessful, Congress take the necessary legislative action to separate the functions of the Army and of the Police, limiting the participation of the Army in the field of public security to an absolute minimum.

Tomorrow I'll give you three more reasons why I believe that soldiers (even ex-soldiers) shouldn’t be playing cops & robbers!

{Disclaimer: All emphasis in the above selections is mine.}

Tags: Guatemala, Army, Police, CEH, Peace Accords

Posted by elcanche at February 23, 2006 10:16 PM